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DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
Volume XV SPRING-SUMMER 1966 Number 2
INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM VERSUS COMPULSORY
UNIONISM: A CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEM
EVERETT MCKINLEY DIRKSEN*
F THERE are tides in the affairs of men which "when taken at their
flood lead on to fortune,"' so too are there tides in the fortunes of
social causes and movements which, if properly grasped, can pro-
pel them to dizzying heights. Just such a tide occurred for American
labor in the mid-1930's, a tide which was to lead to union power and
privilege exceeding the visionary dreams of the most zealous of labor
partisans, and to result in passage of the National Labor Relations Act
in 1935,2 a statute which gave unions such an abundance of riches that
for the next 20 years they virtually staggered under the load.
At the very top of the list of special benefits which this new federal
bonanza gave unions was the exclusive right to represent all workers,
union and non-union alike, in any bargaining unit in which a union
achieved majority status. Coupled with this extraordinary privilege of
exclusive representation, the Act also permitted agreements between
unions and employers to require all employees to join the union and
pay dues to the union as a condition of employment.3
* MR. DIRKSEN is a United States Senator from Illinois and is the Senate Minority
Leader. He received a LL.B from the American University in 1936, and is a member of
the Illinois Bar. He is a Counsellor at Law in the Supreme Court of the United States
of America. Among the honorary degrees he has received is an LL.D. from De Paul
University.
1 SHAKESPEARE, JULIUS CAESAR, Act IV, Scene 3.
2 National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C. S§ 151-87 (1964).
3The original N.L.R.A., ibid., permitted all forms of compulsory unionism, including
the closed shop under which only union members could be hired. The Taft-Hartley
Act amendments in 1947, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-44 (1964), outlawed
the closed shop but permitted union shop agreements under which employees are
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Taking this tide at its flood, union leaders were quick to make com-
pulsory union membership one of their major organizing and bargain-
ing goals. So successful were labor's organizing drives in the ten years
following the enactment of the National Labor Relations Act that
union membership skyrocketed from a level of approximately two
million to an estimated high of seventeen million in the post-war pe-
riod, and union treasuries practically burst at the seams from a ten-
fold increase in dues payments, initiation fees and other types of assess-
ments. No accurate estimate can be made as to how many of these
seventeen million "members" were dragooned into the unions under
compulsory union shop agreements, but a reasonable guess could place
the figure somewhere between two and three million. By a similar
process the amount of dues and fees paid by these unwilling captives
could be estimated as in excess of one hundred million dollars each
year.
In spite of this amazing success, the leaders of organized labor have
never been able to convince the American people of the rightness of
compulsory unionism. So unappealing is the idea that American work-
ers should be forced to pay dues to a union against their will in order
to keep their jobs that a number of states, beginning in 1944, adopted
statutory and constitutional provisions outlawing compulsory union-
ism agreements. Florida, the first state to adopt such a law, put it in
the form of a strikingly simple constitutional amendment, declaring:
[t]he right of persons to work shall not be denied or abridged on account of
membership or nonmembership in any labor union, or labor organization; pro-
vided, that this clause shall not be construed to deny or abridge the right of
employees by and through a labor organization or labor union to bargain collec-
tively with their employer.4
Other states followed Florida's lead in enacting "Right to Work" laws,
and there are currently nineteen states in which such laws are in force!
required to join the union within 30 days after they are hired. The only difference
between these two forms of compulsory union agreements is thus a lag of thirty days
in the time the worker is required to join.
4 FLA. CONsr. art. I, § 12 (1885, as amended, general election, 1944).
5 ALA. CODE tit. 26, S§ 375(1)-(7) (1953); AIz. REV. STAT. ANN. S 23-1302 (1947);
ARK. STAT. ANN. 5 201-202 (1948); FLA. CONST., supra note 4; GA. CODE ANN. § 54-902
(1947); IOWA CODE § 736A.1 (1947); KAN. GEN, STAT. ANN. § 44-802 (1949); MIss. CODE
ANN. S 6984.5 (1954); NEu. CONST. art. XV, § 13 (1946); NEv. REV. STAT. § 613.250
(1953); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-78 (1947); N.D. CENT. CODE § 34-01-14 (1947); S.C. CODE
ANN. §40-46 (1954); S.D. CODE § 17.1101 (1952 supp.); TENN. CODE ANN. S 50-208
(1947); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. art. 5154a, § 1 (1943); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-1-7 (1937); VA.
CODE ANN. § 40-64 (1946); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 27-245.2 (1963 supp.).
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Eleven of these state right to work laws were in force at the time
Congress adopted the Taft-Hartley Act amendments to the National
Labor Relations Act in 1947,' and in order to eliminate any doubt as
to the effect the federal law would have upon such state laws Congress
wrote into the Taft-Hartley Act the now famous section 14(b), which
expressly provides that nothing in the National Labor Relations Act
shall be construed as authorizing the execution or application of agreements re-
quiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment in
any State or Territory in which such execution or application is prohibited by
State or Territorial law.7
For 181 years now, this provision of the law has been regarded by
the leaders of organized labor as their nemesis, their bite noir, a thorn
in their side, a burr under their saddle, a mote in their eye, and, in
short, the bane of their existence. For 18 years, they have sought
unceasingly and unrelentingly to have this clause expunged, torn out
by the roots and consigned to some hideous purgatory which they
feel it so justly deserves. In Congress after Congress since 1947, the
lobbyists of organized labor have had bills introduced to repeal sec-
tion 14(b), but in Congress after Congress, they were met with only
the chilliest of receptions. To most members of Congress it seemed
that the decision made in 1947 to leave the matter of regulating com-
pulsory unionism to the several states was a good decision, and, more-
over, very few members had any great enthusiasm for the idea of giv-
ing general federal sanction to compulsory union membership and
coerced payment of union dues.
In the face of these rebuffs, the union professionals turned their ef-
forts towards getting Congressmen elected who would agree to vote
for repeal of section 14(b). These efforts were not unfruitful, and by
the time the 89th Congress was convened in January of 1965, the labor
chiefs felt the time was ripe to make repeal of section 14(b) their
major number one high priority legislative target. A repeal bill' passed
the House of Representatives on July 28, 1965, by a vote of 221 to
203, after the proponents of the bill blocked every effort to consider
amendments and imposed a rule which drastically limited debate. The
bill then went to the Senate for appropriate action.
Under the rules of the Senate, in contrast to the House, debate on a
6 Supra note 3.
7 49 Star. 457 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (1964).
8 H.R. 77, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
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measure can be curtailed only by adoption of a cloture motion sup-
ported by two-thirds of the Senators present and voting. Since the
Senate supporters of the repeal bill were far fewer than the two-thirds
required for cloture, the opponents of the bill had a full opportunity
to debate its merits.
The extended Senate debate on the repeal question covered a period
of several weeks in September and October 1965 and January and Feb-
ruary of 1966, and filled the Congressional Record with hundreds of
thousands of words of argument, entreaty, attack, defense, logic, emo-
tion and general display of forensic fireworks. The debate was essen-
tially non-partisan, with Senators on both sides of the aisle taking a
stand for and against the repeal measure. Three efforts by opponents
of repeal to limit debate through cloture failed and the bill was finally
laid to rest by the majority leader, Senator Mansfield, on February 10,
1966. Twenty-two Democratic members joined with twenty-seven
Republicans to block the repeal measure.
During the course of the extended debate, numerous constitutional
arguments were made in support of the right to work principle, with
a surprisingly large number of Senators expressing the view that com-
pulsory union membership and coerced payment of union dues runs
counter to the basic concepts of individual freedom expressed in the
First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution and seri-
ously infringes those rights. No person, they argued, should be re-
quired to belong to or pay money to any private organization for the
right to earn a living for himself and his family. In this, they seemed
to be reflecting the instinctive reaction of the American public to com-
pulsory unionism. The fantastic flood of mail which poured into con-
gressional offices during the debates ran as high as twenty to one
against repeal, and every opinion research poll taken throughout the
country by newspapers and professional pollsters showed the general
public overwhelmingly opposed to the idea of forcing a man to join a
union in order to keep his job.
Going beyond this broad public sentiment, many constitutional
scholars are convinced that compulsory unionism must ultimately be
held unconstitutional by our courts as an infringement of the funda-
mental human rights protected by the Constitution. Although the right
to work is not specifically mentioned anywhere in the Constitution,
it is undoubtedly one of those rights which the Founding Fathers felt
were so basic that express enumeration was unnecessary. Under the
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American concept of individual liberty and the dignity of man, every
man must necessarily have the opportunity to procure the means of
survival. To deny this right is not only a deprivation of liberty but a
danger to advancement in life, and even to life itself. This noble idea
was eloquently expressed by Shylock in the Merchant of Venice,
when he said "You take my house when you do take the prop that
doth sustain my house; you take my life when you do take the means
whereby I live." 9 In more recent times, it found expression in language
such as that of Mr. Justice Terrell of the Florida Supreme Court, in
Carpenters Dist. Council v. Miami Chapter, Associated General Con-
tractors,10 wherein he wrote:
The right to work is equivalent to the right to eat and the right to eat and
provide raimant for his dependents is man's most dominant urge. In a free coun-
try like ours such a right should not depend on one's race, color, the lodge, craft,
church or other organizations to which he belongs. Such a requirement is con-
trary to the spirit of our institutions, the basis on which our democracy was
founded and every impulse of the forefathers who gave it existence. I can think
of nothing more out of harmony with true Americanism. Membership in one's
lodge, craft or church may be a means of enlarging spiritual, cultural and phys-
ical assets but to make his bread depend on craft or church membership would
be the worst species of anti-Americanism. 1
The American Civil Liberties Union similarly supported the right
to work principle in an amicus curiae brief filed in Wilson v. Loew's,
Inc.,12 a case challenging the action of a group of. movie studios in
blacklisting the famed "Hollywood Ten" writers who had refused to
answer questions of a congressional committee as to their Communist
party connections. In that brief, the ACLU pointed out that:
The right to work is a human right, a personal right, a constitutional right;
and the opportunity to earn a living cannot be unjustly withheld from a man
without doing violence to the constitutional guarantees protecting his life, lib-
erty, property and assuring him equal protection of the law.' 3
The constitutional protection of the right to work was first pro-
claimed by the United States Supreme Court in the case of Cummings
v. Missouri,14 a decision which invalidated a provision in the Missouri
Constitution under which a Catholic priest was fined for continuing to
9 SHAKESPEARE, MERCHANT OF VENICE, Act IV, Scene 1.
10 55 So. 2d 794 (Fla. 1952). 11 Id. at 796.
12 26 CCH Lab. Cas. at 68,600 (1954).
13 Wilson v. Loew's, Inc., amicus curiae brief of the American Civil Liberties Union.
14 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1866).
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perform the offices of his religion without taking a prescribed oath.
As there stated by the court:
The theory upon which our political institutions rest is, that all men have cer-
tain inalienable rights-that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of hap-
piness; and that in the pursuit of happiness all avocations, all honors, all posi-
tions, are alike open to everyone, and that in the protection of these rights all
are equal before the law.' 5
In many decisions following the Cummings case, the right to work
principle was applied to protect Chinese laundrymen, railroad men,
teachers, and Japanese fishermen. In 1915, the right to work was
declared to be plain and self-evident principle of American Consti-
tutional Law by Justice Charles Evans Hughes in Truax v. Raicb,'°
holding that a state may not deny to lawful inhabitants, because not
native-born, the ordinary means of earning a livelihood. As therein
stated:
It requires no argument to show that the right to work for a living in the
common occupations of the community is of the very essence of the personal
freedom and opportunity that it was the purpose of the [Fourteenth] amend-
ment to secure.1
7
The right to work is not a guarantee of employment by a paternal-
istic system controlling all means of production. It only signifies the
inherent right of every man to an opportunity to seek and retain the
gainful employment which he desires. This is all that state Right to
Work laws ever were intended to preserve for the individual.
It is, of course, evident that compulsory unionism is an abnormal
departure among private associations. No other organizations, not
even churches, have the right to conscript members. So, the public
asks, why should unions? If a man can be compelled to join a union
or contribute to its financial support, what other private organiza-
tion may conscript members, or in effect levy taxes on the privileges
of citizenship?
More to the point, however, is the question as to whether and to
what extent compulsory membership or coerced payment of dues
infringes upon the freedom of association which the First Amendment
seeks to protect. Freedom of association, it has been held, is a com-
posite right derived from freedom of speech, freedom of assembly,
freedom to petition and the general right to liberty of action recog-
15 ld. at 321-22. 16 239 U.S. 33 (1915). 17 Id. at 41.
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nized by the First Amendment. It is actually the legal basis for the
recognition of the right to organize labor unions.
Labor unions have themselves relied very heavily on this concept
of freedom of association to protect their right to engage in organizing
activities and to resist any state laws which placed limitations upon
such organizing activities. For example, in Thomas v. Collins,'8 the
Supreme Court reversed the conviction of R. J. Thomas, an organizer
for the United Automobile Workers, for failure to comply with a
Texas statute which required the licensing of union organizers. In
arguing Thomas' case, union lawyers contended that this licensing
requirement infringed upon the freedom of association guaranteed
under the First Amendment. The Supreme Court agreed in the fol-
lowing eloquent language:
It was not by accident or coincidence that the rights to freedom in speech
and press were coupled in a single guaranty with the rights of the people peace-
ably to assemble and to petition for redress of grievances. All these, though not
identical, are inseparable. They are cognate rights, and therefore are united in
the First Article's assurance.
This conjunction of liberties is not peculiar to religious activities and institu-
tions alone. The First Amendment gives freedom of mind the same security as
freedom of conscience .... Great secular causes, with small ones, are guarded.
The grievances for redress of which the right of petition was insured, and with
it the right of assembly, are not solely religious or political ones. And the rights
of free speech and a free press are not confined to any field of human inter-
est.... 1 .i - ;'
There is some modicum of freedom of thought, speech and assembly which
all citizens of the Republic may exercise throughout its length and breadth,
which no State, nor all together, nor the Nation itself, can prohibit, restrain or
impede. If the restraint were smaller than it is, it is from petty tyrannies that
large ones take root and grow. This fact can be no more plain than when they
are imposed on the most basic rights of all. Seedlings planted in that soil grow
great and, growing, break down the foundations of liberty. 19
Having thus recognized the right to organize workers into unions
as part of the protected freedom of association under the First Amend-
ment, it must follow that the right not to join a union is a necessary
corollary of the right to join, for without a right not to join there
can be no such thing as a right to join. Freedom rests on choice, and
where choice is denied freedom is destroyed as well.
Thus it is that the Supreme Court has recognized the affirmative
and negative sides of constitutional liberties in Board of Education
v. Barnette,20 in upholding the right of members of a religious sect
18323 U.S. 516 (1945). 19Id. at 530, 543. 20319 U.S. 624 (1943).
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to refuse to join in the oath of allegiance to the flag. The court
specifically pointed out that freedom of speech carries with it a
freedom to remain silent. In Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry. Co.
v. Brown,2' the Supreme Court of Kansas said "[ilt would seem that
the liberty to remain silent is correlative with the freedom to speak.
If one must speak, he cannot be said freely to speak. 22
By the same token, if men are to be free to join unions, they must
also be free not to join, for otherwise they will be burdened with a
duty or obligation to join an organization selected, not by themselves
but by others, which is the very antithesis of the freedom of choice
of the individual which is the core of American constitutional liberty.
This premise was explicitly recognized as recently as 1955, in a unani-
mous decision of the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine in Pappas v.
Stacey,28 a case involving a Maine statute which was construed to
prohibit a strike and picketing by three restaurant employees, who
were union members, for the purpose of forcing the employer to make
the other twenty-seven non-union employees join the union. In the
course of its opinion, the court said "[F]reedom to associate of neces-
sity means as well freedom not to associate. '2 4
It is a sorry commentary that organized labor, which has so fre-
quently invoked these constitutional protections in the process of
raising itself up from the impoverished days of the 1930's to its present
position of wealth and power, has now become the usurper of the
constitutional protections of the individual worker. Although unions
zealously claim the right of freedom of association, they seek to deny
it to others, and under sanction of a federal statute, the National
Labor Relations Act, they are free in 31 of the 50 states of the union
to do so.
Through compulsory unionism, the worker is not only deprived of
his freedom of association, but is also deprived of his freedom of con-
science and of speech. It is well known to everyone that American
unions have for the past many years been highly active in politics and
have played a very important role in election campaigns of members
of Congress, of state legislators, state officials, and local city and
county officials. The union chiefs make no apologies for this, but
rather assert that it is their right to make sure that those elected to
21 80 Kan. 312, 102 Pac. 459 (1909). 23 116 A.2d 497 (Maine 1955).
22 Id. at 315, 102 Pac. at 460. 24 Id. at 500.
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public office are sympathetic towards the aims and purposes of
labor unions. Large armies of union staff personnel are assigned to
work in political campaigns at the precinct level in getting out the
vote for union-endorsed candidates; union newspapers and other
publications are heavily devoted to promoting favored candidates,
and union funds derived from membership dues and fees are liber-
ally distributed to such candidates.
Where does this leave the individual worker who is required under
a compulsory unionism agreement to pay his dues and fees into the
union as a necessary condition to holding his job? Is he thus com-
pelled to contribute money to election campaigns for candidates to
which he may be completely opposed, or to support with his dues
dollar causes and ideologies with which he himself may have no
sympathy? And, if so, what is the effect upon his constitutionally
protected liberties? The answer was resoundingly expressed by Justice
Hugo Black, in his dissent in International Association of Machinists
v. Street,25 as follows:
There can be no doubt that the federally sanctioned union-shop contract here,
as it actually works, takes a part of the earnings of some men and turns it over
to others, who spend a substantial part of the funds so received in efforts to
thwart the political, economic and ideological hopes of those whose money has
been forced from them under authority of law. This injects federal compulsion
into the political and ideological processes, a result which I have supposed ev-
eryone would agree the First Amendment was particularly intended to prevent
And it makes no difference if, as is urged, political and legislative activities are
helpful adjuncts of collective bargaining. Doubtless employers could make the
same arguments in favor of compulsory contributions to an association of em-
ployers for use in political and economic programs calculated to help collective
bargaining on their side. But the argument is equally unappealing whoever
makes it. The stark fact is that this Act of Congress is being used as a means to
exact money from these employees to help get votes to win elections for parties
and candidates and to support doctrine they are against. If this is constitutional
the First Amendment is not the charter of political and religious liberty its spon-
sors believed it to be. James Madison, who wrote the Amendment, said in ar-
guing for religious liberty that "the same authority which can force a citizen to
contribute three pence only of his property for the support of any one estab-
lishment, may force him to conform to any other establishment in all cases
whatsoever." And Thomas Jefferson said that "to compel a man to furnish con-
tributions of money for the propagation of opinions which he disbelieves, is sin-
ful and tyrannical." These views of Madison and Jefferson authentically repre-
sent the philosophy embodied in the safeguards of the First Amendment. That
Amendment leaves the Federal Government no power whatever to compel one
man to expend his energy, his time or his money to advance the fortunes of
25 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
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candidates he would like to see defeated or to urge ideologies and causes he
believes would be hurtful to the country.26
Justice Douglas, not known for his hostility to organized labor,
writing a separate opinion in the same case had the following to say:
The collection of dues for paying the costs of collective bargaining of which
each member is a beneficiary is one thing. If, however, dues are used, or assess-
ments are made, to promote or oppose birth control, to repeal or increase the
taxes on cosmetics, to promote or oppose the admission of Red China into the
United Nations, and the like, then the group compels an individual to support
with his money causes beyond what gave rise to the need for group action....
I think the same must be said when union dues or assessments are used to elect a
Governor, a Congressman, a Senator, or a President. It may be said that the
election of a Franklin D. Roosevelt rather than a Calvin Coolidge might be the
best possible way to serve the cause of collective bargaining. But even such a
selective use of union funds for political purposes subordinates the individual's
First Amendment rights to the views of the majority. I do not see how that can
be done, even though the objector retains his rights to campaign, to speak, to
vote as he chooses. For when union funds are used for that purpose, the indi-
vidual is required to finance political projects against which he may be in
rebellion.27
The Street case originated in the state courts of Georgia as an ac-
tion brought by a group of railroad workers covered by a union shop
agreement to challenge the constitutionality of the union shop au-
thorization set forth in the Railway Labor Act.2 ' The trial court
found that the defendant unions were using union dues exacted from
plaintiffs to support the political campaigns of candidates for national,
state and local offices, to propagate political and economic doctrines,
concepts and ideologies, and to promote legislative programs, all of
which were opposed by the plaintiffs. 29
26 Id. at 789-90. 27 Id. at 777-78. 28 45 U.S.C. S 152 at 11 (1964).
29 International Association of Machinists v. Street, 215 Ga. 27, 108 S.E.2d 796 (1959),
wherein the court set out the pertinent findings as follows:
(5) The funds so exacted from plaintiffs and the class they represent by the labor
union defendants have been, and are being, used in substantial amounts by the latter
to support the political campaigns of candidates for the offices of President and Vice
President of the United States, and for the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States, opposed by plaintiffs and the class they represent, and also to sup-
port by direct and indirect financial contributions the political campaigns of candi-
dates for State and local public offices, opposed by plaintiffs and the class they repre-
sent. The said funds are so used both by each of the labor union defendants collective-
ly and in concert among themselves and with other organizations not parties to this
action through associations, leagues, or committees formed for that purpose. (6)
Those funds have been and are being used in substantial amounts to propagate political
and economic doctrines, concepts and ideologies and to promote legislative programs
opposed by plaintiffs and the class they represent. Those funds have also been and
are being used in substantial amounts to impose upon plaintiffs and the class they
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The Supreme Court of Georgia, in sustaining a judgment in favor
of the plaintiffs, stated:
One who is compelled to contribute the fruits of his labor to support or pro-
mote political or economic programs or support candidates for public office is
just as much deprived of his freedom of speech as if he were compelled to give
vocal support to doctrines he opposes.80
On review, the United States Supreme Court ducked the constitutional
issue thus squarely presented, and disposed of the case by holding that
under the regulatory scheme created by the Railway Labor Act,
Congress did not intend that a union may, over an employee's objec-
tion, spend his money for political causes which he opposes. In de-
vising a remedy for such unauthorized union spending, however, the
court left much to be desired. The appropriate remedy, the Court
held, would be not to enjoin the enforced collection of dues, or the
improper spending of the money, but to leave it up to the union to
refund to protesting employees such portion of their dues as repre-
sents the proportionate amount that the union spends for political pur-
poses. On this basis the case was sent back to the Georgia courts,
which then proceeded to direct the defendant unions to produce their
books and records in order that a determination might be made as
to the amounts spent on political action. The unions violently re-
sisted such order, and after four years of additional legal maneuvers
proposed that as an alternative to producing their books they would
refund all dues previously paid by plaintiffs and would relieve plain-
tiffs of all future obligations to pay dues under the compulsory union
shop agreements. Plaintiffs, weary of the expense and effort of more
than eleven years of litigation, accepted this proposal and a stipula-
tion was entered on December 19, 1964 dismissing the case.
In an earlier case, Railway Employees Dept. v. Hanson,81 the Su-
preme Court reversed a decision of the Supreme Court of Nebraska
holding that use of union dues money for political purposes resulted
in violation of the freedom of association guarantee of the First
Amendment and the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.
In its decision, the Court pointed out that on the record before it this
question was not properly raised, and it went on to hold that
represent, as well as upon the general public, conformity to those doctrines, concepts,
ideologies and programs.
3o ld. at 808. 31351 U.S. 225 (1956).
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the requirement for the financial support of the collective bargaining agency by
all who receive the benefits of its work is within the power of Congress under
the Commerce Clause and does not violate the First or Fifth Amendments. 2
Since the impact of a union shop agreement on constitutional rights
must necessarily be related to its practical operation and effects, it is
useless to look at it in only an abstract or theoretical sense as the
court did in the Hanson case. The subsequent Street case gave the
court clear opportunity to get squarely into these First and Fifth
Amendment issues, but it declined to do so. In his dissenting opinion,
Justice Black sharply criticized the majority for evading the issue,
and prophesied:
The constitutional question raised in this case ... is bound to come back here
soon with a record so meticulously perfect that the court cannot escape deciding
it.88
If such a case were presented to today's court, there is reason to
believe that the majority would find compulsory unionism in any of
its forms contrary to the express and implied constitutional guarantees
of individual liberty. The recent trend of the court's decisions in civil
rights cases has so vastly expanded the safeguards of the First, Fifth,
and Fourteenth Amendments that it is almost inconceivable that the
court could now fail to include the right to work within their pro-
tection.
Of particular interest in this connection is the recent discovery of
the Ninth Amendment as a reservoir of individual rights not expressly
or impliedly covered elsewhere in the Constitution. This short and
heretofore obscure amendment reads, "[t]he enumeration in the Con-
stitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage
others retained by the people. 84 In' a very recent decision of the Su-
prcme Court,"5 three of the judges, including the Chief Justice, found
that this clause protects a wide range of individual rights not expressly
mentioned in the first eight amendments. Justice Goldberg, writing
for himself, the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Brennan, stated that:
The concept of liberty protects those personal rights that are fundamental,
and is not confined to the specific terms ofthe Bill of Rights. ... The language
and history of the Ninth Amendment reveals that the Framers of the Constitu-
82 Id. at 238.
88 International Association of Machinists v. Street, supra note 25 at 785.
84 U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
85 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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tion believed that there are additional fundamental rights protected from gov-
ernmental infringement, which exist along side those fundamental rights specif-
ically mentioned in the first eight constitutional amendments.8 6
The Griswold case involved a challenge to the constitutionality
of a Connecticut statute which made dissemination of birth control
devices a criminal offense. Two officers of the Planned Parenthood
League of Connecticut were convicted in a state court under this
statute, and their conviction was affirmed by the Supreme Court of
Errors of Connecticut.87 On appeal, the Supreme Court of the United
States reversed the conviction on the ground that the statute infringed
the "penumbral" protection of individual privacy contained in the
Bill of Rights. The majority opinion, after citing a number of cases
dealing with the protected freedom of association, stated:
The foregoing cases suggest that specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have
penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them
life and substance. The right of association contained in penumbra of the First
Amendment is one, as we have seen. The Third Amendment in its prohibition
against the quartering of soldiers in any house in time of peace without the con-
sent of the owner is another. The Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms the
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures. The Fifth Amendment in its Self-
Incrimination Clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which the
government may not force him to surrender to his detriment. The Ninth
Amendment provides that the enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.38
Expanding on this application of the Ninth Amendment, as a residue
of rights not otherwise referred to, the separate opinion written by
Justice Goldberg stated:
In determining which rights are fundamental, judges are not left at large to
decide cases in light of their personal and private notions. Rather, they must
look to the traditions and [collective] conscience of our people to determine
whether a principle is so rooted [there] as to be ranked as fundamental. The
inquiry is whether a right involved is of such a character that it cannot be de-
nied without violating those fundamental principles of liberty and justice which
lie at the base of all of our civil and political institutions. ' 9
This language of Justice Goldberg is strikingly applicable to the
right to work. There can be little question that the right of a man to
work to earn a living for himself and support his family is so deeply
3 ld. at 487-88.
37 State v. Griswold, 151 Conn. 544, 200 A.2d 479 (1964).
38 Supra note 35 at 484. 39 Id. at 493.
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
rooted in "the traditions and collective conscience of our people...
as to be ranked as fundamental. ' 40
On the assumption, then, that a man's right to work at his chosen
occupation is, under the principles expressed in the Griswold case,
to be regarded as one of the fundamental rights protected by the
Constitution, does the restriction which the compulsory union shop
places on such right breach the Constitution? Can it not be argued
that the Constitution is intended only to protect the citizen against
government action affecting such rights, and that labor unions in
enforcing union shop agreements are acting purely in a private ca-
pacity? Can it not be said that while such union conduct may result
in an actionable tort it is not prohibited by the Constitution because
it is neither an act of the state nor the federal government, nor of
any other governmental entity? As stated in Teague v. Brotherhood
of Locomotive Firemen:4'
Private parties acting upon their own initiative and expressing their own will,
however else they may offend and their acts give rise to justiciable controver-
sies, do not thereby offend the guarantees of the Constitution. 42
Surely if one private citizen by coercion or restraint prevents another
private citizen from exercising his freedom of speech or any other
constitutionally protected right, there is no basis for invoking the
Constitution as against the tortfeasor. Does not this apply as well to
labor union efforts to enforce compulsory membership?
The answer is No. The authority which unions have to enforce
compulsory unionism derives from a legislative act of the federal
government, the National Labor Relations Act,43 which expressly
authorizes union shop agreements. Moreover, the entire scheme of
regulation contained in the National Labor Relations Act is directed
toward encouragement of unionization and collective bargaining, 44 and
40 Ibid. 41 127 F.2d 53 (6th Cir. 1942). 42 Id. at 56.
43 National Labor Relations Act § 8(a) (3), 49 Stat. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3)
(1964).
44 National Labor Relations Act S 1, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C. 5 151 (1964),
which states the policy of the Act in the following terms: "It is hereby declared to be
the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions
to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and eliminate these obstructions when
they have occurred by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining
and by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organiza-
tion, and designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose ofnego-
tiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or pro-
tection."
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by giving unions the extraordinary status of exclusive bargaining
representative, this Act has created and perpetuated the conditions
under which unions may enforce compulsory unionism. As stated
by the Supreme Court in American Communications Association v.
Douds:45
When authority derives in part from Government's thumb on the scales, the
exercise of that power by private persons becomes closely akin in some respects
to its exercise by Government itself.46
In Railway Employees' Dept v. Hanson,47 the United States Su-
preme Court expressed approval of the reasoning of the Supreme
Court of Nebraska that the union shop provisions of the Railway
Labor Act were a necessary part of every union shop contract en-
tered into on the railroads, and that such contracts could not other-
wise be enforced in Nebraska. The Supreme Court stated:
We agree with that view. If private rights are being invaded it is by force of
an agreement made pursuant to federal law which expressly declares that state
law is superseded. In other words, the federal statute is the source of power and
authority by which any private rights are lost or sacrificed. The enactment of
the federal statute authorizing union shop agreements is the governmental ac-
tion on which the Constitution operates, though it takes a private agreement to
invoke the federal sanction.
A union agreement made pursuant to the Railway Labor Act has therefore
the imprimatur of the federal law upon it and, by force of the Supremacy
Clause of Article VI of the Constitution, could not be made illegal nor vitiated
by any provisions of the laws of a state.48
Although the Supreme Court in the Hanson case was dealing only
with the union shop provisions of the Railway Labor Act, similar
reasoning can be applied to the union shop provisions of the National
Labor Relations Act. It is equally true that a union shop agreement
entered into pursuant to section 8 (a) (3) of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act 49 has "the imprimatur of the federal law upon it."5 More-
over, the exclusive bargaining status which unions are given under
the Act is the principal source of their power to demand and enforce
union shop contracts. The value of this "exclusive" status to unions
was well summarized by Professor Archibald Cox of the Harvard
45 339 U.S. 382 (1950). 4 7 Supra note 31.
46 Id. at 401. 48 Id. at 232.
49 Supra note 43.
50 Railway Employees Dept. v. Hanson, supra note 31 at 232.
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Law School when testifying before the Senate Labor Subcommittee
in 1959. As expressed by Professor Cox:
labor unions enjoy their present power by virtue of Federal statutes, chiefly the
National Labor Relations Act. Other voluntary associations are different in two
respects: (1) they lack the statutory power of a union designated as a bargain-
ing representative; (2) no other voluntary association has as much power over
an individual's livelihood and opportunities or over the rules governing his daily
life. The union bulks much larger in the life of a worker than a corporation in
the affairs of a stockholder.51
This status of "exclusive" bargaining representative is a unique
condition enjoyed only by labor unions in the United States, con-
trasted with the conditions under which unions function in the
countries of Europe and other developed areas. In the Western
European countries with their long history and tradition of unionism
and collective bargaining, the bargaining process remains a private
process with practically no government intrusion, no special legal
status for labor unions and no legally sanctioned compulsory unionism
in any of its forms. Public policy in these European countries affirms
the concept of the right of private association as both an affirmative
and negative right; that there is a positive right to form or join a
private association such as a labor union, and that there is necessarily
also a positive right not to join.
It is curious that we here in the United States who are so preoccu-
pied and concerned with individual liberties have so long tolerated
such a flagrant abuse of individual liberty as compulsory unionism.
It is not likely that this tolerance will continue indefinitely because
the American public is becoming more and more aware of the prob-
lem. The most direct manner of meeting the problem would be, of
course, to eliminate from the National Labor Relations Act the pro-
viso to section 8(a)(3) which authorizes compulsory union con-
tracts.5 2 This is not a practical solution at present, because it would
not be possible in the face of the political power wielded by organized
labor to get such an amendment through Congress. There is also the
fact that many members of Congress who oppose compulsory union-
ism feel that this is a matter which should be left to the states, as it
has been left to the states under section 14(b), 3 rather than pre-
empted by federal law.
51 Hearings Before the Senate Subcownnittee on Labor, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. at 112
(1959).
52 Supra note 43. 53 Supra note 7.
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Accordingly, looking down the road which lies head, our best
hope for outlawing compulsory unionism in America must lie with
our courts and their recognition of the Constitution as a shield be-
tween the working man and the union officials who seek to force him
to join a union or pay tribute to a union as the price of keeping his
job. We can only wait in anticipation of that bright Monday morning
when the Supreme Court will at last announce the restoration of this
important principle of civil rights which has been so long and so
sadly ignored.
